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NOTES
damages are confined to those resulting from loss to the beneficiaries,
and do not include those recoverable by the deceased had he lived or
by his personal representative.
F. Under either the Survival Statute or the Wrongful Death
Statute all defenses available against the injured person had he lived
may also be set up in these actions, subject to a possible exception when
the injured person or his representative has permitted the Statute
of Limitations to bar the action for personal injuries.
ALLEN CROUCH
THE LIABILITY OF LANDOWNERS TO
TRESPASSING CHILDREN
The gradual evolution of the common law has shown a persistent
inclination toward protection of personal rights at the expense of property
rights when a conflict exists between them.1 The ancient rules govern-
ing the duties of landowners toward others were entirely adequate in the
feudal society in which they developed. But social and economic changes,
with the consequent change in ideas of justice, have made many of these
rules obsolete.
The difficulty in allowing a trespasser to recover from a landowner
was that the law imposed no duty upon him to take any steps to protect
a trespasser. Each landowner was a sort of sovereign unto himself.2 Early
encroachments on this primitive idea raised a duty on his part not to in-
2Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His Premises of
Their Own Right, 69 U. OF PA. L. REV. 237 (1921), ". . . there is a gradual but
persistent weakening of the original concept that the owner was sovereign within his
own boundaries and as such might do what he pleased on or with his own domain.
The King's law stopped at the boundary of the owner's sovereign territory except in
felonies and in trespass actions, which were originally punitive and extensions of the
appeals for felonies to violent misdemeanors. When the comparatively modem law
of negligence reached the relations of landowners to persons entering his property it
found the field occupied by this concept of the owner's right as sovereign to do what
he pleased on or with his own property. The history of this subject is one of con-
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flict intentional injury on a trespasser,3 or to set traps. 4 Later develop-
ments raised a duty on the part of the landlord when the trespasser was
discovered,5 and, in some cases, when the landowner knew that the area
was used frequently by trespassers. 6
I. ORIGIN Op ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DocTRiNE
Lynch v. Nurdin7 was the first case in which a child was allowed
to recover damages for injuries sustained while trespassing. In that
case the defendant had left a cart unattended in a public street. Plaintiff,
a boy of seven, got up on the cart; when another boy led the horse,
plaintiff was thrown down and injured. In 1874, in Sioux City & P. R. R.
v. Stout8 the Supreme Court of the United States allowed a six-year-old
boy to recover for injury sustained while trespassing on an unlocked
railroad turntable. The court relied on Lynch v. Nurdin and on an early
American case, Birge v. Gardner,9 to sustain the recovery. The Stout
case is generally cited as introducing the turntable or attractive nuisance
doctrine into the United States. Actually the principle was established by
two earlier American cases.' 0 In relying on Lynch v. Nurdin the court
was on doubtful ground because of the fact that it was a case of trespass
to chattels in a public street. Nevertheless, the Stout case gave other
courts an eminent precedent to open the way for recovery by trespassing
children." The doctrine is now well established in most jurisdictions.
Although some courts reject the doctrine completely,' 2 even these juris-
'Collins v. Renison, 96 Eng. Rep. 830 (1754); Gregory v. Hill, 101 Eng. Rep. 1400
(1799).
'Bird v. Holbrook, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1828).
'Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 109 AUt. 653 (1920); see Frederick v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576 (1940).
'Fearons v. Kansas City Elevated R. R., 180 Mo. 208, 79 S. W. 394 (1904);
Smith v. Boston & M. R. R., 87 N. H. 246, 177 Atl. 729 (1935); Davis v. Chicago &
N. W. R. R., 58 Wis. 646, 17 N. W. 406 (1883).
71 Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
884 U. S. 657 (1874).
919 Conn. 507 (1849) (Child recovered for injury incurred while playing on a gate
located on defendant's land).
"Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507 (1849); Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 387
(1858) (Child allowed to recover for an injury caused by wheels of mill located
on defendant's land).
"Keefe v. Milwaukee & S. P. R. R., 21 Minn. 207 (1875) (Turntable).
'Daniels -v. New York & N. E. R. R., 154 Mass. 349, 28 N. E. 283 (1891); Ryan
2
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dictions sometimes allow a recovery on other grounds.1 3 Although the
doctrine has received considerable criticism,' 4 it is approved by most
modem writers.15
II. FORESEEABILITY or HA1r To TRESPASSERS
Justice Holmes placed a limit on the doctrine by devising the fiction
of an implied invitation.' 6 He took the position that a landowner by
keeping an attractive nuisance impliedly invites children upon his land.
As in that event they are invitees and not trespassers, a greater degree
of care is required of the landowner. The idea of an implied invitation
was a chimerical kind of legal fiction: certainly no landowner, by any
stretch of imagination, is inviting trespassing children when he maintains
on his land a device which is likely to injure them. This limitation was
indicative of the propensity of Justice Holmes for judge-made rules which
would obviate intervention by a jury.17 Under this view a child must
enter the premises because of the attractive nuisance; and if the child
v. Towar, 128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644 (1901); Turess v. New York S. & W. R. R.,
61 N. J. L. 314, 40 AUt. 614 (1893); Walsh v. Fitchburg R. R., 145 N. Y. 301, 39
N. E. 1068 (1895).
"'Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co., 260 N. Y. 604, i84 N. E. 112, affirming 234
App. Div. 567, 256 N. Y. Supp. 323 (1932), 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. 544 (1933).
1 Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission, 11
HMiv. L. REv. "49 (1898); see BuRniex, Taz LAW op Toars 552 (4th ed. 1926),
where the author says: "If the doctrine is carried to its logical conclusion, it would
render the owner of a fruit tree liable for damages to a trespassing boy, who, in
attempting to get the fruit, should fall from the tree and be injured, or who should
be made sick by eating green or harmful fruit." Such a criticism is hardly
valid in view of the fact that no cases can be found where a landowner has been
held liable for injuries caused by the natural condition of the premises.
1 
xERooo, Mo~mrx ToRT PROBLES 186 (1941); HAPER, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW oF Tomr §93 (1933); PRossER, HArDBOOK OP THE LAW OF ToRTS 617 (1941);
Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner; Basis of Responsibility in
Tort, 21 M ic. L. REv. 495 (1923).
"United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268 (1922).
"See Baltimore & Ohio R. R. -v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66; Holmes, in Law in
Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REv. 443, 457 (1899): ". . . every time
that a judge declines to rule whether certain conduct is negligent or not he avows his
inability to state the law, and... the meaning of leaving nice questions to the jury
is that while if a question of law is pretty clear we can decide it, as it is our duty
to do so, if it is difficult it can be decided better by twelve men taken at random
from the street."
3
Van de Motter: The Liability of Landowners to Trespassing Children
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
enters for another reason and after he is on the land discovers the object
that causes him the injury, he cannot recover.18 This limitation on the
doctrine has been since rejected by the United States Supreme Court' 9
and by most other courts.2 0
The sounder view is that the landowner is liable where it is fore-
seeable that children will trespass and that injury to them is probable.2 1
The Florida court has adopted this rule as a primary test of liability.2 2
Statements are sometimes found in cases to the effect that a distinction
should be made between devices along a highway or near a playground
and devices located at more remote places on private property.2 3 Ac-
tually such a distinction is valid only as bearing upon whether or not
the trespasses are foreseeable. The same reasoning is applicable when
the device causing the injury is located inside a building-the location of
the device goes only to the foreseeability of the trespass.2 4
As long as the trespass is foreseeable, the landowner is required
to guard the child against unreasonable risks of harm.2 5 The land-
owner is not an insurer of the safety of the child.2 0 He is entitled to rely
on the child's guarding himself against those obvious dangers on the
premises that even a small child can understand, such as fire,2 7 excava-
"8Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 8 P.2d 249
(1932), 27 Ixi,. L. Rv. 549; rehearing 40 Ariz. 282, 11 P.2d 839 (1932); 6 So.
CATLF. L. Xxv. 255 (1933).
1 Best 'v. District of Columbia, 291 U. S. 411 (1934), 34 CoL. L. Rv. 782, 29 ILL.
L. Xxv. 253.
"Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484 (1895); Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295 S. W. 175 (1927); Cart v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay.
Co., 123 Ore. 259, 261 Pac. 899 (1927).
21HARPER, A TREATISE ox THE LAW Op TOaRTS §93 (1933); PRossEa, HANBoom w
THE LAw op TORTs 619 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §339(a) (1934).
"Stark v. Holtzclaw-, 90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 330 (1925) (Defectively insulated
wires strung through a magnolia tree, which was located near a playground, caused
injury to eight-year-old boy who climbed tree to get magnolia blossoms. The court
refers to the plaintiff as a trespasser, and certainly the defective wiring was not the
cause of the trespass).
2Ibid.
"Note, 86 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 300 (1938).
" RE TATEMENT, ToTs §339(b) (1934).
"'Clarke v. City of Richmond, 83 Va. 355, 5 S. E. 369 (1888).
"Botticelli v. Winters, 125 Conn. 537, 7 A 2d 443 (1939); Erickson v. Great
Northern R. R., 82 Minn. 60, 84 N. W. 462 (1900).
4
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tionS,28 or natural conditions of the land.2 9 If the child is capable of
appreciating the danger involved, the landowner is not liable.3 0
There has been some judicial attempt to establish arbitrarily an upper
age limit. 3 ' It is difficult to see how this could be done with any more
success in attractive nuisance cases than in other cases involving the con-
tributory negligence of children. In cases of the latter type most courts
have not fixed such a limit.3 2 The parallel is compelling. If the child
is capable of contributory negligence, he should be barred from recovery
under the attractive nuisance doctrine; if he is not capable of contributory
negligence, he should be within the doctrine.3 3
"Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Calif. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901); Savannah, F. & W. R. R.
v. Beavers, 113 Ga. 398, 39 S. E. 82 (1901).
29EREDGT, MoDENx ToRT PoBsws 187 (1941): "No case has ever held a pos-
sessor of land liable to a trespasser, either adult or infant, for harm caused by a
natural condition. So far as decided authority goes this is true even though a
possessor knows of the trespasser's presence and that a word of warning would turn
him from his peril."
2"New York, N. H. & H.R. R. v. Fruchter, 260 U. S. 141 (1922) (Plaintiff, a boy
of eight, was injured by electric wires on a bridge. It was shown that plaintiff knew
the danger involved and had been chased away several times before by policeman);
Rodgers v. Lees, 140 Pa. St. 475, 21 Ad. 399 (1891) (Boy of seven, on a dare by
another boy, rode up a pulley in defendant's mill. He became scared, let go, and was
killed. He knew the danger involved but went ahead anyway).
SlBarnhill v. Mt. Morgan Coal Co., 215 Fed. 608 (E. D. Ky. 1910) (fourteen
years); Central of Georgia R. R. v. Robins, 209 Ala. 6, 95 So. 367 (1923) (Boy of
fifteen denied recovery by analogy to Alabama rules of contributory negligence of
children). This case was cited with approval in the Florida Magnolia Blossom case
cited supra, note 22. Pollard v. Oklahoma City R. RL, 36 Okla. 96, 128 Pac. 300
(1912) (fourteen years). Contra: Ekdahl v. Minnesota Utility Co., 203 Minn. 374,
281 N. W. 517 (1938); Schorr v. Minnesota Utility Co, 203 Minn. 384, 281 N. W.
523 (1938), 23 MmN. L. REy. 241 (1939) (Two cases where the court allowed
the jury to find that attractive nuisance doctrine applied where boys were fifteen
and sixteen respectively); see Louisville & N. R. R. v. Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295
S. W. 175 (1927) (Though old in years a child may still be protected by the
doctrine if he -s underdeveloped mentally).
"See Dupuls v. Heider, 113 Fla. 679, 683, 152 So. 659, 661 (934): "Age is not
the determining factor always on the question of the capability of exercising care.
If a person is capable, by reason or mentality, intelligence, experience, training, dis-
cretion, alertness, of exercising care in a given situation, he is amenable to the con-
sequences of his contributory negligence in a transaction resulting in his injury."
"Dennis Adn'r v. Ky. & W. Va. Power Co., 258 Ky. 106, 79 S. W.2d 377 (1935),
25 Ky. L. J. 277 (1937). In Central of Georgia R. P. v. Robins, cited supra note
31, the court reasoned by analogy to the contributory negligence rules. This would
5
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III. CONSIDERATIONS Ol SOCIAL POLICY
A most important limitation on the doctrine which is not discussed
in most of the cases is, nevertheless, considered by most of the
courts. 3 4  To impose on landowners too strict a liability to tres-
passing children would seriously interfere with the operation of
business. The social value of the conduct of a man's business should
be balanced against the humanitarian concern for the welfare of tres-
passing children.3 5 If a landowner operating a device can make it safe
for such children with the expenditure of a small amount of money, he
should be required to do so. For example, most turntables can be made
safe at small expense--the cost of a lock. If making the land safe would
requi-e the expenditure of an unreasonable amount of money or would
seriously interfere with business, the landowners should not be required
to take such precautions. This limitation would seem to be in accord
with current ideas of justice. It gives the court a further limitation on
the doctrine to prevent recovery by the child where such a recovery
would subject the courts to criticism by the lay public.3 6
indicate that courts that fix arbitrary limits in case of the contributory negligence
of children, as in the Robins case, would also fix such an arbitrary limit in cases of
attractive nuisance. Since the Florida court has not fixed such an arbitrary limit in
cases of contributory negligence of children (see Dupuis case, cited supra note 32), it
will probably not fix such a limit in attractive nuisance cases.
"4Bauer, The Degree of Danger and the Degree of Difficulty of Removal oj the
Danger as Factors in "Attractive Nuisance" Cases, 18 MINN. L. Rxv. 523 (1934);
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §339(d) (1934).
"Albert, C., in Chicago B. & Q. R. R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N. W.
880, 882 (1902): "The business of life is better carried forward by the use of danger-
ous machinery; hence the public good demands its use, although occasionally such use
results in the loss of life or limb. It does so because the danger is insignificant, when
weighed against the benefits resulting from the use of such machinery, and for the
same reason demands its reasonable, most effective, and unrestricted use, up to the
point where the benefits resulting from such use no longer outweigh the danger to be
anticipated from it. At that point the public good demands restrictions .... We may
conceive of means by which it might be rendered absolutely safe, but such means
would so interfere with its beneficial use that the danger to be anticipated would not
justify their adoption; therefore the public good demands its use without them."
"As an example of such criticism see Hoover, When Will You Be Sued, Saturday
Evening Post, April 5, 1947, digested in Reader's Digest, June, 1947. The author
criticizes the attractive nuisance doctrine at some length, apparently without under-
standing it. As a particularly flagrant example of the application of the doctrine, he
gives the facts and holding of a doubtful case to sustain his position. Actually the
6
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This limitation has not been expressly considered by the Florida court.
Since all'of the cases that have come before the court have been decided
in favor of the plaintiff,3 7 the court has put no such restriction on the
doctrine. But all of the Florida cases, with one possible exception,38
indicate that even with such a restriction the result would probably have
been the same. It is probable that this balance will be struck in proper
cases in the future, even though it may not be expressly discussed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of attractive nuisance is firmly established in American
law.3 9 It requires landowners to guard against unreasonable risks of
case cited is from New York, a state which rejects the doctrine. See Parnell v.
Holland Furnace Co., 260 1. Y. 604, 184 N. E. 112, ajiming 234 App. Div. 567,
256 N. Y. Supp. 323 (1932), 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. 544 (1933).
"'Johnson v. Wood, 155 Fla. 753, 21 So.2d 353 (1945) (mortar box); Atlantic
Peninsular Holding Co. v. Oenbrink, 133 Fla. 325, 182 So. 812 (19.38) (abandoned
hotel); Peters v. City of Tampa, 115 Fla. 666, 155 So. 854 (1934) (banks of stream
undermined by construction of sewer); May v. Simmons, 104 Fla. 707, 140 So. 780
(1932) (ice conveyor); Stark v. Holtzclaw, 9Q Fla. 207, 105 So. 330 (1925) (de-
fective wiring strung through magnolia tree). The decision in the Johnson case
is questionable on the ground of non-foreseeability of harm to children, though the
trespass was foreseeable. There the defendant maintained a mortar box near the side-
walk; plaintiff was injured when another child threw some of the mixture into
plaintiff's eyes. Under similar factual situations, other courts have said that no injury
was foreseeable. Lotta v. Brooks, 293 Ky. 346, 169 S. W.2d 7 (1943); Fitzpatrick v.
Donahue Realty Co., 151 rm. 128, 186 N. W. 141 (1922).
8 Atlantic Peninsular Holding Co. v. Oenbrink, 133 Fla. 325, 182 So. 812 (1938)
(Plaintiff was injured while trespassing in defendant's abandoned hotel, which was
partially completed). Obviously it would have required considerable expense to make
the premises safe for children. The decision can probably be justified on the ground of
slight social utility to the owner.
"RETATMZ MT, ToRrs §339 (1934) states the doctrine as follows: "A possessor
of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon
caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon his land,
if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor
knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one which the possessor knows or should know and which
he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their yottth do not discover the condition or realize
7
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